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Preface 
The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics a t  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is t o  develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid to  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts' concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography' of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that  successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought t o  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts' is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal - all the way t o  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant to pursue an 'evolutionary' interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection' by which inter- 
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active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
Speculative phenomena have for a long time fascinated a wide range of observers, from 
historians and psychologists to economists. However, their approaches are quite 
different. Historians and psychologists emphasize the recurrence of seeiningly irrational 
individual and collective behaviours, speculative crisis being an example of collective 
manias and panics driven by runiours and other epidemics-like effects. On the contrary, 
most economists view speculation as the outcome of rational econoniic behaviours. In 
this latter view, rational agents engage i n  speculative trade because asyninietric 
information or differentiate risk aversion can lead theni to think they can realize 
'unexpected' profits. Both purposes are compatible with the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis (REH). This approach is well-exemplified in e.g. Hirschleifer (1975), 
Figlewski (1978), and in rational bubbles modelsl. An alternative hypothesis to the same 
effect is that, if individuals were to be non rational and trade on the ground of "wrong" 
beliefs, they would be eliminated from the market via a process akin to natural selection 
(Friedman ( 1953)). 
The theory of rational speculation has been challenged both by theoretical paradoxes and 
empirical puzzles. Concerning the latter, one should mention among others a) the 
persistence of predictable profit opportunities (positive autocorrelation of expected returns 
on the stock market, persistent bias in  the forward discount on foreign exchange market, 
e.g. Bilson (1981)), b) statistical 'anonlalies' of the price series, as leptokurtosis and 
volatility clustering (Friedman & Vandersteel(l982) and Baillie & MacMahon (1989)), 
and c) the micro-evidence of systeniatic biases in the way individuals form their 
expectations, thus leading to question the adequacy of the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis. In particular, one observes contagion effects (Shiller (1989)) and threshold 
effects related to nominal values of exchange rates, (De Grauwe & Decupere (1992)) ; 
systeniatic biases in the formation of individual beliefs (Ito (1990) and Camerer (1987)) ; 
and heterogeneity of the interpretative models agents use to process infornlntion (Frankel 
8: Froot (1987) and Froot & Ito (1989)). More generally, empirical studies of speculative 
episodes point to the central role of average opinion, of 'market psychology', in price 
dynamics. As shown by the adjectives usually employed to qualify its 'mood', e.g. 
"tense, feverish, depressed, optimistic...", the market is considered as an entity, 
endowed with a personality of its own (Arthur (1992)). Another general feature of the 
formation of beliefs on fiilancial markets is the seemingly pervasiveness of tacit 
knowledge in the predictive rules used by agents. This tacit knowledge is often referred 
to by market operators as 'intuition', 'gut-feeling', 'coninion sense' (see the answers to 
l ~ h e r e  is a vast literature on rational bubbles; see the seminal contributions of Flood & Garber (1980) 
and Blanchard & Watson (1982), and for a survey, Rosser (1991). 
Shiller's questionnaire (1989)) and other similar expressions falsely conveying the idea 
of a gift rather than that of a skill acquired th~.ough a learning process. 
From a theoretical standpoint, "rational speculation" has to face even more serious 
problems. 
First, as shown by recent research on speculative bubbles and sunspots equilibria, 
rational expectation models cannot generally rule out multiplicity of possible equilibria. In 
principle, convergence to any one of them may occur via two mechanisms: 'irrational' 
agents can be eliminated from the market by a selection process or they can learn to 
become 'rational' -whatever that means-, or combinations of the two. However, up to 
now no general result of convergence and stability has been achieved, leaving us with a 
basic indeterminacy concerning the aggregate outcollie of out-of-equilibri~lni speculative 
dynamics (see for instance Bray (1982) and De Long er al. (1990))'. 
Second, if information is costly and equilibrium prices accurately reflects all available 
inforniation, nobody will have an incentive to gather i t  because they can infer i t  from the 
observation of market prices. But then, as Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) are pointing out, 
what information will be revealed by prices i f  nobody is infoned? 
Third, if by whatever mechanism the economy converges to an equilibrium, there is no 
reason why trade should continue. This 'no trade' paradox is basically due to the 
assumption that individuals are homogeneous (which is implicit in rational expectations 
models). Being rational, they all share the same model of the world -which is the "true" 
model- and cannot form beliefs different enough to justify betting against each other. 
Hence, they have no incentive to trade and rational speculation is impossible (Tirole 
(1982) and Milgrom &Stokey (1982)). 
This 'no trade' result addresses a fundamental question at the core of economic theory. 
Indeed, homogeneity of agents is crucial in  that it allows (via the 'representative agent' 
technique) a simple aggregation of microbehaviours. If all agents behave in  the same 
way, rationally pursuing their self-interest, the collective behaviour can be infered from 
the observation of the 'modal' individual behaviour. In this respect, the homogeneity 
assumption can be considered a kind of shortcut to surrogate A. Smith's Invisible Hand. 
Economic theory faces a dilemnia: by niaintaining a strong version of individual 
rationality as a foundation, it cannot explain satisfactorily why so much trade occurs on 
e.g. financial markets (as a reminder, the daily volume of transaction on the foreign 
exchange market alone is close to $ 1000 billions). Putting i t  differently, it appears to be 
l ~ o r  discussions of the various issues relaled to the mechanisms of convergence LO a REE, see also 
Frydman & Phelps (Eds) (1983), and the other papers of the spccial issue of the Journal of Economic 
Theory, (1982). 
inipossible to keep together at the same time rationality - in the standard econoniists' 
sense-, speculation and equilibrium. 
The purpose of this paper is to outline an alternative approach to speculative phenomena 
based on micro-heterogeneity and imperfect, adaptive, rationality. Speculation is seen as 
a disequilibrium dynamics generated by the interaction of less-than-rational 
heterogeneous agents that can be subject to contagioirs euphoria and panic, but that are 
also able to learn and modify their behaviour through time. The basic idea on which the 
representation of these learning processes is built is that of "mental niodels" developed, in  
different perspective, by Johnson-Laird (1983), Lakoff (1987), and Holland, Holyoak, 
Nisbett & Thagard (1986). Once we allow for agents to have different and evolving 
models of the world, the collective outcouie of the market can only be studied by 
specifying the niechanisms by which agents interact. Learning processes and interaction 
mechanisms will be sketched out i n  section 11. Section 111 presents a "pure speculation" 
model grounded on these hypotheses, arid the simulation results are discussed i n  section 
IV. Section V highlights the major conclusions and the research task ahead. 
I1 Speculation in disequilibrium 
Pure speculation: the Beauty Corltest rnetnplwr 
Speculative behaviour is generally defined as a transaction with the purpose to realize a 
capital gain (e.g. buying low today i n  order to sell high tomorrow, see Keynes (1936) 
and Kaldor (1939)). Forming an expectation about future prices is thus the main activity 
of a speculator. 
If speculators are rational and know the fundaniental value of the asset or the currency 
they are trading, they will buy when the price is inferior to its fundamental value and sell 
otherwise. By doing so, they contribute to push the price back to that fundamental value: 
speculation cannot be destabilizing (Friednian (1953)). However, this argument is valid 
only if all agents are rational, have the same inodel of equilibrium prices and share the 
same beliefs about the automatic return to these equilibriuni values (and this is conimon 
knowledge). But if individuals don't share the sanie representations about ecluilibriuni 
prices, no such stabilizing mechanism is likely to exist. It is one of the basic conjectures 
of this work that a speculative market where agents are truly heterogeneous can go 
through different regimes and experience very rich dynamics. 
In a situation of 'true' uncertainty, i n  the Keynesian or Austrian sense, i.e. i n  a non 
transparent and constantly evolving environment, individuals cannot know the "true" 
model of the world'. They form hypotheses on its functioning, try, 11iake niistake, learn 
and adapt. Their strategies can someti~iles be locally optimal, but, because of the non 
stationarity of the environment (if ollly because of learning), this har~iloriy cannot last 
infinitely. With such experience-dependent processes of beliefs forniation, individuals 
will not in general share the sarne representation of the world. They are heterogeneous, 
and that is their principal incentive to transact: each agent believes that his model is 
"better" than those of the others, and that there is an opportunity of profit even in the 
absence of new information. Thus, a speculative market is ultimately a market where 
individual models of the world confront each others, i.e. where the price is determined by 
the interaction of agents trying to guess the average opinion in order to beat the market. 
Such dynamics of cl-oss-expectations has besn highlighted by Keynes (1936), who was 
comparing in his famous parable the functioning of financial rmarkets to a beauty contest 
where the participants had to choose the nicest face among some photographs of faces, 
the winner being the one whose choice was closest to the average choice. As the variable 
agents have to predict is the result of their collective activity, the dynamics of this type of 
market is highly self-referential. If agents are inlperfectly rational and heterogeneous, 
they can only try to imagim what the others are thinking, and the collective dynamics 
results from these cross expectations. As just said, the tliain conject~~re of this work is 
that such a formation of beliefs can lead to the emergence of unexpected aggregate 
outcomes exhibiting co~llplicated dynamics, even without shocks on the fundamental 
variables. 
In  order to explore this conjecture, we built a nlodel of 'pure speculation', without 
fundanlentals, where the price results fro111 the interaction of less-than-rational and 
heterogeneous agents. Because agents are persistently and unpredictably different in  what 
they think and what they do, no simple procedure of aggregation exists, and the collective 
outcome of the system can be known only by specifying the mechanisms by which they 
interact. Studying this type of systems thus involves the development of appropriate 
theoretical tools, accounting explicitly for individual learning processes. These systems 
cannot generally be solved analytically and have to be studied by simulation. A 
methodology of simulation referred to as 'artificial life' has been recently developed, 
mainly i n  biology and cognitive and computer sciences, which allows to study the 
behaviour of such 'complex' systems2. An artificial world is, to paraphrase Lane (1992), 
a computer implementable system composed of a) micro-units interacting i n  an 
environment and b) an aggregate dynamics emerging from these interactions. The micro- 
' See for instance Dosi & Egidi (1991 j and Arlhur (1992). 
2 ~ e e  Langton et al (1991) and, for applications of this approach in econo~nics, Lane (1992). 
units are generally evolving through tinie via processes of learning and adaptation to their 
environment, thus pern~anently introducing novelty in the system: the dynaniics of such a 
'complex adaptive system' is open-ended ( in  the sense that unequivocal asyn~ptotic 
outcomes can hardly be predicted). 
Following this methodology, we built a model of an "artificial speculative market", where 
price dynamics can be analyzed under alrernative hypotheses concerning the micro-units 
and the market mechanisms by which they interact1. Let us present our main hypotheses. 
Category fonmtion and mental t?zociels 
If we abandon the hypothesis that agents know the 'tnle' model of the world, we have to 
account for the mechanisnis by which individual representarions emerge and evolve. 
Following recent developments in cognitive sciences, we start from the assun~ption that 
individuals are building "mental ~nodels of donlains" (Johnson-Laird (1991), p. 2), i.e. 
sets of representations of the world linked together, whose "structure corresponds to the 
way i n  which human beings conceive the strucrure of the world" (ihidetn). A mental 
model is a hierarchical structure (a system) of concepts and categories that can be 
"manipulated to produce expectations about the environment" (Holland et al. (1986), p. 
12). The basic units constituting the model, nanlely, the categories, are not alone 
conveying meaning; as relations between these 'units' are reproducing in some ways the 
perceived structure of the world, the specific organization between categories is itself 
meaningful. Hence, this organization depends upon the content, the seniantics of the 
categories and not, as it  is the case i n  probabilistic approaches of induction, of fornlal 
syntactic rules2. Such a "semantic point of view" has fundan~ental implications about 
properties of knowledge accumulation, as i t  is able to explain tvhy people make only a 
small part of all the possible inferences that can be imagined. Indeed, as the structure of 
the model is meaningful in itself, new information that is consistent with i t  will be more 
easily integrated i n  the model, whereas dissonant information will tend to be ignored3. 
Thus, inductive inferences are partly constrained by existing knowledge. 
Two broad approaches of category forn~ation are usually distinguished (Lakoff (1987)). 
The 'objective' approach defines categories by the set of properties they have in common: 
one has to be able to list exhaustively all the characteristics of an object in order to foml a 
lThe first work of this type was done by Arthur, Holland, LeBaron, Palmer & Taylor at the Sanm Fe 
Institute; Beluatti & Margarita (1992) have built another of such "artificial financial market". 
2 0 n  approaches of induction i n  terms of mental models, see also Johnson-Laird (1983) and Lakoff 
(1987). On these points, see also Keynes (1921), Bell, Raiffa & Tversky (Eds.) (1988). and Gigerenzer el 
al. (1989). 
3 ~ h i s  last point is consistent with empirical evidence about thc gcneral phenomenon of cogniiive 
dissonance, e.g. Aaronson (1 972). 
representation of it. Symnietrically, i f  one of these characteristics has changed. one is 
unable to recognize that i t  is the saiiie object. Following the path-breaking work of 
E. Rosch, another approach has been developed, grounded on the recognition that even 
though the world is varied, uncertain, and constantly evolving, individuals are still able to 
form representations of it, understanding diversity and adapting to changes. This 
approach suggests that a category is foriiied by a 'prototype' assorted of defaults, i.e. of 
possible exceptions that one can accept without contradicting the category. Such 
categories can be built even i f  the wol-Id is iliiperfectly understood and changing all the 
time: by modifying and refining this network of defaults, one can adapt to diversity and 
novelty. 
In this view, a niental model is organized i n  a hierarchy of defaults, i.e. in sets of 
categories of different levels (generallspecific) linked together by these defaults'. The 
mechanisms by which these models are formed are niainly inductive ones. "Induction 
tries to find regt~larity and coherence behind the observations. Its niost corispicuous 
instruments are generalization, specialization, analogy. Tentative generalization starts 
from an effort to understand the observed facts; it is based on analogy, and tested by 
further special cases" (Polya (1945), p. 117). When a category is contradicted by an 
observation, a default will be added to take into account this new information. This is an 
operation of specialization. If other iriforniations repeatedly contradict the category, at 
some point, the individual niay want to form a more general category that will not be 
falsified by observations2. Finally, people niay use a niodel or part of a n~odel developed 
in one domain to build a representation of another doniriin that is perceived as siniilar to 
the first one. This last operation can be seen as rin anrilogy. 
Another important issue concerns the place of iri tuition (or 'g~~t-feeling', as some traders 
would put it, e.g. Shiller (1989)). This issue is of course never addressed by rational 
choice theory since there is no place for i t  in, say, Savage's axionlatisation of individual 
choice. March & Sinion (1993) distinguish between two complenientary types of logic of 
action, a deliberative one and a tacit one. The deliberative, or explicit one (the "logic of 
consequences" in March 8: Sinion's ternis) consists i n  nianipulating different niodels and 
comparing their respective predictions, i.e. what philosophers call gedankenexperimenr. 
The tacit mode (the "logic of appropriateness") relates to pattern-recognition and ruled- 
based behaviour, and is a "skill in recognizing those things that have become familiar 
through past experience" (March 8: Sinion (1993), p. 16). In terms of niental models, 
l ~ o r  more details on dcfaul~ hierarchies, sce Johnson-Laird (1983) and Holland a 01. ( 1  986). 
2 ~ h i s  can give rise LO some kind of "~hreshold effccu". Whcn exactly will thrcshol(ls uiggcr changes is 
another complicated matter. Studies of cognitive dissonance nienlioncd above show us  hat individuals 
seem to have very different levcls of resistance to contradictory fhc~s. 
"things that have become frt~lliliar through past experielice" are ernbedded i n  the specific 
organization of the categories, i.e. i n  the structure of a rne11t:il nlodel, and intuition results 
from an implicit inferential process, done 'inside' one ~llodel (instead of comparing the 
outcomes of different models). 
Finally, i t  should be emphasized that mental models can be of different type, depending 
upon the purpose for which they are developed. Sonie are descriptive, others include 
causality relationships andlor n~rinati\~e aspects, as needed by the agent with respect to 
the task he has to perfom, the goal he wants to achieve or the problem he tries to solve. 
Knowledge accumulation is thus contingent to the activity of human beings, oriented by 
their roles and functions in the envirorlriient (or society at large): i t  is "embodied" (Lakoff 
(1987)) or "embedded" (Granovetter (1985)) in broader social and cultural foriilsl. 
LRarrlirlg dyru~rnics 
A niodel can be seen as an hypothesis about the world, leading to predictions. In case of 
'false' predictions, the hierarchical structure of the niodel ;illows for the identification of 
the part of the niodel resporlsible for the error. The inlpression of a gap between the 
world and the niodel one has of i t  becoiiles more acute. Depending of the amplitude of the 
gap, i.e. of the place of the defaults i n  the hierarchy, the nlodel can either be modified or 
replaced by another one. If the falsified defaults are at the top of the hierarchy, the model 
will have to be abandoned, and soiiie kind of exploratiorl process will start. As noted 
before, induction is constrained by existing knowledge and contingent to the specific type 
of activity. A new hypothesis can be formed by recoiilbi~lirlg parts of the old model, and 
learning can be seen as a "procedure that discovers a way in  which to combine old 
functions so as to create new ones" (Johnson-Laird (1983), p. 143). Often, repeated 
failures of the old model will have highlighted sonie of the 'weaknesses' of the previous 
representation, and alternative hypotheses may have started to be formed. I t  is also 
possible to t h i n k  of alternative hypotheses permanently coexisting i n  one's mind, 
especially when confronted to a rapidly changing environnlent 
Such a distinction between a kind of 'linear' accumulation of knowledge inside one 
model and the discontinuities of knowledge's evolution related to changes of models is 
close to the one made by Kuhn between 'normal' and 'revolutionary' science, as well as 
to March's 'exploitation' and 'exploration' dichotomy (1991). Indeed, one of the 
difficulties in studying learning mechanisms is to represent this tension between the 
exploitation of existing knowledge and the exploration of novel directions. As Holland 
l ~ h u s ,  induction is not only constrained by existing knowledge, but also oriented by individual's roles 
and objectives, thus accounting for the fact that, while making inferences, we do not explore all the 'space 
of possible worlds'. 
(1986) puts it: "because of [lie uncer~~inty ;itt;lched to ; i l l  induction, the process has to be 
conducted in  such a w;iy that the systrlii can absorb nem rules. telit;ltives, without 
destroying abilities developed i n  f i ~ n i i l i i ~ r  siti~ations" (p. 594 ). 
Learning dynamics results froni a double interaction. First, categories interact to generate 
'higher level' models, organized so :is to represent the perceived structure of the world. 
Second, individuals interact with their environnient, constantly receiving and processing 
new information. These pieces of information may reinforce sollie categories and 
contradict others, provoking a change in  representations, i.e. a riiodificatio~i of the 
models' structure. Hence, such learning mechanisnis iniply a constant transformation of 
individual representations, a continuous process of adaptation and local adjustment to 
non-stationary en\lironnients. 
The learning dynamics generated by these mechanisms has the following characteristics: 
i) Learning is adaptive, because its 'directions' depend upon esisting knowledge, upon 
path-dependent perceptions of changes i n  the environnient and upon individuals goals. 
ii) Chariges in  the environment are perceived and interpreted through already existing 
models, and in  turn contribute to modify the models themsslves. A niodel which is often 
and successfully used will tend to be reinforced bec:iuse of its familiar usefulness, and 
contradictory facts that do not fdlsify its 'core' representations will tend to be ignored. 
Thus, this is an aspect of the interaction between the agent and its environment which 
might entail an implicit positive feedback leading to phenonienon of 'cognitive lock-in''. 
iii) Finally, when categories at the highest level of the hierarchy are falsified, the niodel 
has to be abandoned and replaced while a subset of knowledge will be relegated to the 
background of the memory. This corresponds to a discontinuitv in the accumulation of 
knowledge. 
Such an approach to learning processes is quite far froni the usual representation of 
learning in economics, most often formalized through bayesian probability updating 
procedures. Nonetheless, we think it can lead to an interesting representation of 
niicrobehaviours on speculative markets. First, as 'history matters', agents are supposed 
to have heterogeneous niodels of the world and are thus ready to take bets against each 
other. Second, because of its foundations upon prototypical categories and default 
hierarchies, this kind of approach can give an account of learning even in uncertain and 
non-stationary environments. Third, diverse niental models easily allow for both routine- 
type and deliberative actions. Fourth, the persistent tension and arbitrage between 
exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration of new domains is able to account for 
 AS mentioned, this type of dynamics is highly path-dependant, and to some exieni irreversible (e.g. 
Arthur et al. (1987). David (1988), Arlhur (1989) and (1992). 
discontinuities, threshold effects and other 'peci11i;irities' i n  learning dynamics well 
documented i n  empirical studies. This basic approach sh;ill inspire the n~odelling of the 
behaviour of our 'artificial agents'. 
Before turning to niarket interaction, let us add a last remark. We do not claim of course 
that human cognition is strictly isonlorphic to the representation of mental models that 
follows. But we do indeed claim that models of adaptation and search such as the one 
presented here help in understanding sonle basic stylized facts of nlicrobehaviours (at 
least with regards to financial markets) and might ever1 c:ipture some generic properties of 
the dynamics of representations of agents facing uncertain environments. 
Tlie interaction of heterogeneous aget1t.s 
When agents on a niarket are heterogeneoi~s, price fornlvtion can be ur~derstood only by 
specifying the way they interact. "Knowing the nom1s, preferences, motives and beliefs 
of participants to collective behaviour can, i n  most cases. give necessary but not 
sufficient conditions i n  explaining the aggregate resi~lt: one needs to add a model giving 
an account of the interaction and of the aggregation of these preferences" (Granovetter 
(1978), p. 1421). To study the formation of a speculative price thus requires to specify 
the mechanisms by which agents coni~~lunicate and trade, as well as the way their 
representations are modified through these interactions. Indeed, price is determined by 
the collective behaviour of the market. When the environnlent changes, individuals must 
modify their models of the world and their decision rilles, i.e. nlilst adapt. We have here 
a circular process, from the environment to individual behaviours, from the latter to 
collective behaviour, and back to the environment. 
As Lesoi~rne (1991) suggests, a distinction cri11 be 111ade bet~veen two functions of a 
market, namely an organizing and a creative one. The first concerns all institutional 
arrangements which art: governing exchanges of goods and infor111:ition (the way agents 
meet and trade, the bargaining rules leading to the effective price lit which goods will be 
traded etc ...). The institutional characteristics governing these interactions (what is 
exchanged? following what kind of procedures?) influence the mode of price formation. 
But "interaction between agents on a market can also endogenously generate a whole 
array of institutions" (Lesourne, ibidem, p. 20). It is the market's creative function. On a 
speculative market, interaction does not really create institutions, but dominant 
representations, norms of judgement, conventions. Two processes play a fundamental 
role in this respect, i.e. selection and learning. Selection ("what kind of behaviour brings 
positive payoffs?") determines the composition of the market, i.e. the type of smtegies 
and models which are dominating the market at a certain time, and the price formation'. 
l ~ h e  links selection and interaction enterlain with each olhcr are still to be explored. This is one of lhe 
numerous point a satisfactory evolutionis1 Lhcory should addrcss, hut i t  will not be done hcre. 
Learning, by modifying representations, expectations and decision rules, introduces a 
dynamics on the nnrure of the behaviours which are to become prevalent iri the market at a 
certain time. It is creating the variety on which selection operates. As, contrary to most 
models of the evolutionary games type, models and representations are not given but 
emerge endogenously, price dynamics is truly evolutionary in the sense that it is an open- 
ended dynamics (e.g. Silverberg (1988)). 
The market is thus a locus where different processes are combined: 
* Interaction between heteroge~ieous agents who are meeting and exchanging goods and 
informatio~is following procedures determined by institutional rules and habits and 
behavioural norms current on this specific miuket'. 
* Individual learning and adaptation to changes in the environment, and especially to 
changes in the behaviours of the others: the evolutio~i of the representations of each agent 
depends upon what he perceives and understands of the representations of the others. 
Hence, agents d o  not only interact "materially" through their actions, but also "mentally", 
in their specific foresight procedures . 
* Selection, determining at each nioment which action is the most perfomiing one. On a 
speculative market, this process entails a dynamics, as the performance of a specific 
behaviour depends upon guesses on the distribution of behaviours and in turn affects the 
latter. This positive feedback can generate cumulative, path-dependent processes2. 
Indeed, "the reference by which agents are determining their behaviour is riot a norm 
exterior to the process analyzed; i t  is produced by the process itself, by the average 
opinion" (Orlean (1988), p. 15). Most often. average opinion is emerging from the 
multitude of bilateral encounters happening during trrtnsi~ctions, and fro111 the network of 
reciprocal influences linking individual representations. The latter are not stable, but 
evolve, thus modifying average opinion and the definition of what a "good"behaviour is. 
In fact, actions and representations co-evolve, the market selecting at each moment a 
particular correspondence between models of the world and performances, i.e. the "best" 
decision rule in a particular configuration of the market. We suggest that such a self- 
referential functioning of the market may either generate a) cumulative, path-dependent 
dynamics, whereby arbitrary rules impose themselves because everybody believes they 
are the "best" ones, or  b) relatively stable situations, similar to what Keynes named 
'conventions', when agents have heterogeneous rules but implicitly agree on the 
boundaries of the price dynamics, or  finally c)  different speculation processes amongst 
l ~ h e s e  institutional rules will be detailed in the next section. Wc will no1 cnler into h c  discussion of the 
emergence of these rulcs, and the l ink i t  has with habits and norms, albcii this qucstion is cerlainly 
central to the undcrslanding of the cocxislcncc of differeni forms of markct. 
2 ~ n  addition to the authors alrcl~dy ~ncntioncd aho\.c, see, for such modcls on financial markcts, Orlbn 
(1990) and Kirman (1991)). 
groups of agents characterized by diverse 'visions of the world' and yielding 
unpredictable collective dynaniics. 
I11 A model of pure speculation \jfith adaptive agents 
In this section we present a niodel of an artificial specul:ition niarket where a population 
of artificial agents, modelled as classifiers systenis, trade a given asset. For simplicity we 
can assume that we deal with an exchange rate market where only two currencies exist, A 
and B. We will assume currency A as the rir~r?ze'raire of the niarket. Trade takes place at 
discrete time ( t  = 0,1,2, ....) and at each nionient in  time each agent has three possible 
actions at his disposal: 
- buy one u n i t  of currency A,  paying the cosresponding amount of B cliroted by the 
market: 
- sell one unit  of currency A,  receiving the corresponding amount of currency B quoted 
by the market; 
- hold the present position without engaging in any trade. 
We assume that trade is centralized: once all agents have posted their intended actions, an 
auctioneer will conipute the new market price at which all possible transactions will take 
place. Thus agents engage i n  trade before kriowirig the price :it which tratisactions will 
take place, price being in fact the outcollie of the decisions taken by the entire population, 
and in particular of the relation between nuniber of buyers and number of sellers. 
In what follows we first present a simplified version of classifiers systems by means of 
which we niodel our artificial agents and then we describe the i~istitutional mechanisms 
which regulate the trans;~ctions in  our a~tificial market. In  the next section we will present 
some of the most significant results froni siniulations of this niodel of artificial niarket. 
Artificial agenrs. 
We claim that classifiers systems provide rr valuable niodel of learning artificial agents 
who are primarily engaged in  adaptively revising the niodel of the world through which 
they formulate expectations on the future evolution of the niarket. 
Classifiers systems are highly general learning systems which process a set of condition- 
action rules in  order to achieve high adaptation to co~iiplex and largely unknown 
environmental conditions. The very low requirenient of a priori knowledge, the high 
generality and simplicity of the methodology, combined with the complexity of the 
I A  presentation of the Classifier Systems methodology and its main applications can be found in the 
works by John Holland (see especially Holland (1 975) and (1 986), Holland el al. (1 986)); a discussion of 
some possible applications to eco~iomics can be found in Arthur (I 991 ). 
patterns of behaviour they can produce, make them very attractive for applications in  
behavioural and social sciences. 
Classifiers systenis model an artificial learning agent as a set of condition-action rules 
which are processed in  a typically evolutionary fashion, as they are subject to a process 
of selection and a process of mutation. 
The first element which characterizes our classifier systeni is the message (signal) agents 
receive from the environment. Such a message - which contains some information about 
the recent history of the market - is freely available to every agent, but has to be 
interpreted and connected to a consequent action according to a model of the world which 
differs across agents and is always sub-iect to possible revisions. I n  particular, we 
suppose that at each time t agents can ohserve the eschiinge rate ;it time t - 1  (which we will 
indicate by p,-l), the moving average of the exchange rate i n  the last k periods and the 
ratio between the number of buyers and the number of sellers (as a measure of the degree 
of "optimism" of the market). These three variables - referred to time t-l - are encoded as 
binary strings of given length: 
m11 m12 ..... mln I mzl ni22 ..... m2, I m31 11132 ..... 1113~ with ni,, E (0.1) 
Each agent is niodelled as a set of condition-action rules which are processed in a parallel 
fashion. Each rule makes a particu1:ir action condition;il upon the fulfilment of a condition 
concerning the present state of the world (which in  o~r r  case is represented by the input 
message containing the value of the three variables). The condition part is therefore 
actiially made LIP of three stri~ils (one for each variable) of symbols which encode a 
subset of the states of nature and is activated when the last detected state of the world f;ills 
into such a subset. Thus the condition part is composed by three strings of n symbols (as 
many as the bits of each component of the environmental message) over the alphabet 
(O,l,#I: 
~ 1 1 ~ 1 2  ..... cln I ~ 2 1 ~ 2 2  ..... ~ 2 n  I ~31C32.....~3" with c;, E (0.1 ,#) 
The condition is satisfied when, either c;j = mij or c;j = #; i.e. the symbol # acts as a 
"don't care" symbol which does not pose any constraint on the corresponding bit of the 
environmental message. 
It can be easily shown that this way of codifying conditions amounts to defining sets of 
intervals on the axis of the corresponding variable. Such intervals can be interpreted as 
categories or information cells which contain all the states of the world which are 
indistinguishable to the agent. A set of condition defines therefore a model of the world, 
i.e. a subset of the power set of the set of states of the world; only its a special case may 
this subset be a partition of the set of states of the world, as reclui~.ed by Bayesian 
learning models. 
To each condition corresponds an itction. which is silnply a ternary bit which encodes the 
three possible actions (buy, sell or hold): 
a1 with a1 E (B,S,H) 
All in all, each agent i n  our artificial market is represented by a set of such condition- 
action rules: 
where: 
In addition each rule is assigned a "strength" and a "specificity" (or its reciprocal 
"generality") measure. Strength basically measures the past i~sefi~lness of the rule, that is 
the payoffs cunii~lated every time the rule has been applied: specificity measures the 
strictness of the condition: i n  our case the highest specitlcity (or lowest generality) value 
is given to a rule whose condition does not have any "#" symbol and therefore is satisfied 
only by one particular value of the input variables, whereas the lowest specificity (or the 
highest generality) is given to a rule whose condition is entirely formed by "#" symbols 
and is therefore always satisfied by the occurrence of any state of the world. 
At the beginning of each simulation agents are supposed to be :tbsolutely ignorant about 
the characteristics of the e~lvironment, as they are endowed with ;i set of randomly 
generated rules. Decision makers are also assumed to have limited computational 
capabilities, therefore the number of rules which model each of them is kept constant over 
time and is relatively "small" i n  comparison to the complesity of the problem which is 
being tackled. 
This set of rules is processed i n  the following steps throughout the simulation process: 
1) Condition matching: a message is received from the environment which informs the 
system about the last state of the world. Such a message is compared with the condition 
of all the rules and the rules which are matched, i.e. those which apply to such a state of 
the world, enter the following step. 
2) Competition among matched rules: all the rules whose condition is satisfied compete i n  
order to designate the one which is allowed to execute its action. To enter this conipetition 
each rule makes a bid based on its strength atid on its specificity. In other words, the bid 
of each niatched rule is proportional to its past usefi~lness (strength) and its relevance to 
the present situation (specificity): 
Bid (Ria,) = kl (k2 + k3 Specificity (Ri ) )  Strength (Ri,,) 
Where kl, k2 and k3 are constant coefficients. 
The winning rule is chosen randomly, with probabilities proportional to such bids. 
3) Action and strength updating: the winning rule executes the action indicated by its 
action part and has its own strength reduced by the a~iiount of the bid and increased by 
the payoff that the action receives, give11 the occurrence of the "real" state of the world. If 
the j-th nlle is the winner of the competition. we have: 
Strength (R i , [ t l )  = Strength (Rj<[)  + Payoff ( t )  - Bid (R,.,) 
4) Generation of new n~les: the system nii~st be able not orilj. to select the ~iiost si~ccessful 
rules, but also to discover new ones. This is ensured by applying "genetic operators" 
which, by recombining and mutating elements of the already existing and niost successful 
rules, introduce new ones which could improve the performance of the system. In  this 
way new rules are constantly injected into the system and scope for new search is always 
made available. 
Genetic operators generate new rules which explore other possibilities in  the proximity 
(in a sense which we are goins to define precisely) of the presently niost successful ones, 
in order to discover the elements which determine their success and exploit them more 
thoroughly: the search is not completely random but influenced by the system's past 
history. New rules so generated substitute the weakest ones. so that the total nuniber of 
rules is kept constant. 
Two genetic operators have been used for the condition part and one for the action pan. 
The latter is simply a mutation of the existing action. I t  is applied with a given (small) 
probability and implies that the action included in  the newly generated rule is randomly 
chosen between the two actions different from the one ;tppearing in  the parent rule. 
The two operators used for the condition part deserve more attention because of their role 
in modelling the evolution of the state of knowledge embedded into the system. They 
operate in opposite directions: 
a) Snecification: a new condition is created which i11cre:ises the specificity of the parent 
one: wherever the parent condition presents a "#", this is ni11t;ited into a "0" or a " 1 "  
(randomly chosen) with a given (sn1:ill) p~.ob;ibility. 
b) Generalisation: the new condition decreases the specificity of the pruent one: wherever 
the latter presents a "Ow or a " I " ,  this is ~nutsted into a "#" with a given (small) 
probability. 
Specification and generalisation are two possible cognitive attitudes which tend to drive 
the learning system towards, respectively, specific rules which apply to narrower 
intervals of values of the variables and more robust rules which instead cover a wider set 
of states of the world. Different degrees of specification and generalisation can be 
simulated both by means of different combinations of these two genetic operators and by 
varying the coefficient k3 with which specificity enters the bid equation: the higher this 
coefficient, the more highly specific rules will be likely to be selected against general 
ones. The simulations discussed in the rest of the paper will use a specificity coefficient 
to summarize the overall inclination of the system tow~ird the search for specific rules, 
such coefficient will represent both the value k7 in  the bid ecluation and the probability of 
application of the genetic operator "specification" every time the genetic operators routine 
is called. 
The Market 
In the simulations which we present i n  the next section we niodel a simple artificial 
market, characterized by the absence of transaction costs and wealth effects and by a one- 
period-ahead expectation structure. We also suppose that the niarket is created out of 
nothing at time t=O, with a fictitious starting price po. The market is pop~~lated by a 
relatively large number of agents (N=100) modelled as classifiers systems and who, at 
each moment in time, take one out of the three possible decisions and con~niunicate i t  to 
the auctioneer. The auctioneer can thus summarize the state of the market by means of the 
numbers NB, Ns and NH which indicate respectively the number of buyers, the number 
of sellers and the number of holders (by definition N = NB + Ns + NH). The auctioneer 
can now allow a number NT of transacrions to take place: 
NT = niin (NR, Ns) 
at a price which is set according to the following n ~ l e  which makes i t  vary proportionally 
to the disequilibrium between the number of buyers and the number of sellers: 
I f  Ne # Ns and some rationing is necessary, the individirals who are irnable ro perform 
the desired trans;iction ;ire randomly chosen. 
Once all the trnnsactions have been carried out at the new market price, each agent 
receives a payoff according to his decisiori and to the price val-iation. The payoff stnlctirre 
is reported in the following matrix: 
where x, and x b  ;ire co~ist;t~lt parameters and B, = N R / N ~  
This payoff structure entails that agents are rewarded when they buy if the price has 
decreased and sell if i t  has increased, i.e. our agents behave like Friedmanian agents. The 
other alternative would have been to reward them when they buy if the price increase and 
sell otherwise, expecting the increase to continue. Such "positive feedback tradingMis 
believed to be one of the source of market inst:rbility (see e.g. De Long et al. (1990), but 
i t  requires an expectation structure of at least two periods to be modeled. With a one- 
period ahead expectation structure, taking into account positive feedback strategies would 
be like 'forcing' bubbles into the model: hence the Friedmanian agents. It should 
nevertheless be noted that: 
-One period-ahead strategies is sufficient to give an account of the central role of average 
opinion. Agents who make profits are those who sell when the expect the majority to buy 
and vice-versa. 
-Fitness is endogenous, as the definition of what a 'good' beh:iviour is depends upon the 
dismbution of behaviours across the population. 
-Finally, if speculation is destabilizing when agents are Friedminian, i t  is reason~ible to 
suppose that it would be even more so if agents were positive feedback traders. 
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I V  Simulation results 
The results of the simulations we present here are very preliminary but some interesting 
features do nonetheless emerge. First, the market is more or less all the tinle at a "quasi- 
temporary equilibrium" in  the sense that i t  almost clears, i.e. the number of rationed 
agents is very small. Second, the price dyriamics genersted by this simple model are quite 
rich, exhibiting periods characterized by price stability and others by bubble-like 
phenomena. Third, the features of the learning process of the individual agents, and 
particularly the "exploitation/exploration" dimension, have a significant effect on the price 
dynamics. 
Let us first recall the main parameters of the model and give the pi~rameters' values 
conesponding to the reference situation. 
-Profit parameters: 
x s , ~  = x b , ~  = 10 
xs ,B  = 71b.A = -2  
-Learning parameters: 
k3 = 0.5 
probability of specification: p(s) = 0.5 
probability of generaliztion: p(g) = 0.3 
Market cleorirzp 
The organization of the market with centralized infornlittio~l and centralized transactions 
allows i t  to reach a quasi market-clearing price almost ;ill  the time, even though quantities 
are fixed to one unit per transaction. Indeed, fixed quantities introduces a bias as, for the 
market to clear, the number of buyers must be exactly eclual to the number of sellers, and 
no quantity adjustment is allowed. There is always a sn1;tll percentage of rationed agents 
(between 5% and lo%), but surprisingly low for such n model where agents do not have 
any conmon equilibrium model on which to coordinate. Figure (1) shows the volunie of 
transaction during two sub-periods o f  simulation (1) (which is presented below).The 
upper part of the chart corresponds to the volunie of the 200 first iterations, where the 
price dynamics is quite turbulent. At the beginning a lot of agents are choosing not to 
transact, they wait; but slowly, as they learn their en\.ironn~ent, bids and asks increase 
and symmetrically the nuniber of agents who are not trading drops1. Nonetheless, during 
the entire sub-period, bids and asks are reniarkably close and rationed agents represent 
only around 5 8  of the population. The  lower part of the chart shows the transaction 
volume corresponding to the last 200 iterations of the same simulation, where the price is 
l ~ h i s  Tcature is consistent with solnc 'no-wade' resulis whcrc unccrtainry is thc main Tactor explaining 
why agents don't uansact, see Tor ins~~nce Bossaens (1992). 
~iiuch rnore stable. Here, transaction voli~~iie is higher (80% of the agents are transacting) 
and more stable (the mean of the number of trnns;~ction is ;\rotr~id 40 all the time). Again, 
rationed agents are few (less than 102)  and bids and asks are close to each other (but for 
very shon- ten11 discrepancies). 
Volume of transaction 
Figure ( 1 )  
The market-clearing properties of this kitid of 1ii;trket orgi~niz:~tion (quite siniilar to a 
double auction) are now well doci~liientedl, bi~t he re:ison\ for this efficiency are still not 
well-understood. Why and how agents coordiliate their behaviour i n  such a \yay that bids 
and asks are more or less always equal? I t  is pa~.ticularly surprising here where, contrary 
to experinielital studies where agents ;ire endowed wit ti the same equilibrium model, our 
artificial agents are truly heterogeneous and do not have a common niodel of the world. 
The reasons for this "spontaneous" coordination are twofold. First, the structure of the 
payoff matrix entails some kind of "Friedmaninn" reinforcenient: agents who are bullish 
when the ~iiarket is bearish get a positive payoff, whereas agents on the majority side of 
the market are penalized. As we already said, such a payoff structure rules out more 
coniplicated strategies like positive feedback trading. Second, our artificial agents seem to 
be learning about their environment. If they were nor, the payoff structure would not 
condition their actions. 
It should be noted that, if this "regressive" payoff srructure allows the ~iiarket o reach a 
"quasi-temporary equilibrium", i t  is not enough ro warrant price stability, contrary to 
Friedman's argilnient. Indeed, all the siniulations show rhar price dynamics is sub.ject to 
turbulence and bubble-like events, even if the marker almost cle;irs. I n  other words, a 
regressive payoff structure does not warrant stability if agents are heterogeneous and do 
not have all the same idea of an ecluilibriuni price. 
Different market regimes 
Two siniulations of the reference ~iiodel are shown i n  figure (2) and (3). One feature of 
these simulations is the sequence of bubble-like events ;~nd periods of relative stability, 
which tend to confimi the corijecrilre that speculative price dynaliiics can be characterized 
by two "polar opposite regimes", one reginie of turbulence and one reginie of stability, 
both of them generated by the sanie market mechanisms. Intuitively, this is consistent 
with recent results concerning the behaviour of "complex adaptive systenis": order and 
fluctuations are two aspects of the same dynaniical process (see for instance the work of 
Bak & Chen on self-organized criticalities). 
These simulations also show that price stability occurs for different periods of time (froni 
800 to 3000 iterations) and different levels of prices. Hence, there is not any 
convergence, but only transient stability away from a st:ttion:try state. Following Bak & 
Chen (1991) and Lane (1992), we will qualify this transient stability as metastability. 
'see for instance the experimental work of Smith el al. (1988), and for a survey, Hcy (1991). 
Figure ( 2 )  
Figure (3) 
Figure (3) (continued) 
In  this niodel, the formation of beliefs and representatio~is are at the core of speculative 
dynamics: prices are determined by ;I coniplicated striictilre of cross-expectations of the 
Keynesian 'Beauty Contest' type. As we did not elidow agents e s  atzre with ;my 
particular niodel of the world, tlieir representations are enierging arid evolving through 
continuous interaction with their environment. 'This self-referential process generates a 
path-dependent price dynamics where both "polar opposite regimes" are self-reinforcing. 
In the metastable regime, the environnient does not change conspicuously, agents adapt 
to it and modify their beliefs only marginally, hence reinforcing stability. Symmetrically, 
when agents do not manage to learn   bout tlieir enviroliliient because i t  is changing too 
fast, their representations are evolvirig all the tiliie, increasing instability'. 
These results are consistent with ;i) what hi~s been obtained in contagion nlodels like the 
ones by OrlCan (1990) and Kirnian (1991). and b) ecoriolnetric eviderice on the non- 
stationarity of the distribution~ fr-on1 which price variations ;ire drawn s(e.g. Friedn~an 8( 
Vandersteel (1982) and Bollerslev et ril. (1991)). They cluestion the ability of a 
speculative niarket to reach an eqililibriilln when agents have different visions of the 
world. 
Exploitatinti v s  e.rplorariorz 
The dichoton~y between exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration of novel 
hypotheses is central in the modelling of microbeh:~viours proposed here. There are 
basically two forces in our learning niodel which -together- set a particular balance 
between exploitation and exp1or:ltion. The first concerns the reward/reinforcement 
mechanisni and is controlled by the re\v;ird which the environment assigns to acting 
rules. High positive rewards to ' p o d '  rules will tend to illcrease the likelihood that they 
will be used again i n  the future: conversely, low neg:~tive rewards to 'bad' rules will 
decrease the likelihood of their futilre use, loosing i n  this w:~y exploratory feature they 
can possibly contain. 
Similarily, the frequency and intensity of application of the genetic algorithni clearly acts 
upon the balance between exploitation of existing nlles and generation of new ones.Al1 in 
all, high relative rewards and low frequency genetic algorithms will tend to produce 
highly exploitative systems. whereas low relative rewards and high frequency genetic 
algorithms will tend to produce explorative systems. 
l one  of the challenges in such a n~odcl is lo specify the lurning (or critical) poinis, i.e. whal makes the 
market enter into a phase of turbulcnce when i t  was bcforc relatively stable, and vice versa. Unfortunately 
we are unable to do it now.Thesc. poinls certainly involve thresholds in individual representations and 
other discontinuities in lcaming ~xoccsscs, but a more precise invcstigalion will havc to be delayed uniil 
further research is acco~nplished on the ~nodclling of learning processes. 
Figure (4) shows two simulations; the upper simulation is one from the reference model, 
and the lower orie correspo~~ds to an identical situation but for the vali~es of the profit 
parameters that have been doubled ( n , . ~  = n b , ~  = 20 and n,.B = x b , ~  = -4). The 
Exploitation vs exploration 
Figure (4) 
comparison between these two simulations clearly shows that a higher weight given to 
exploitation relative to exploration tends to stabilize price dynaniics. As the 'good' rules 
are strongly reinforced, agents will stick to them and not change their representations too 
often. Since in this model, the environnient of each agent is made up exclusively by the 
others, if all agents behave in a relatively inertial manner, the environment will be quite 
stable, and rules that were 'good' will continue to be 'good'. Such a self-reinforcing 
niechanism in the formation of representations can lead to situations of 'lock-in' (see e.g. 
Arthur (1992)); in which the region where the price will stabilize itself depends upon the 
content of the rules which emerged as 'good' rules at the beginning of the process. 
Generality and specifity of rules 
By varying k3 (the specificity parameter i n  the bucket brigade) arid the probabilities given 
to generalization and specification in the genetic algorithm, we can study the iriipact of 
these two 'cognitive attitudes' on the price dynaniics. General rules are robust rules, in 
the sense that they associate the same action to a wide set of states of the world. In 
providing the same autoniatic response to a range of signals, they can be thought of a 
kind of routine1. Alternatively, general rules can siniply niean that agents are ignorant, 
and that they cannot decode their environment successfully. 
Routinized behaviour on financial niarkets, as chartism and techrlical analysis, is believed 
to have a destabilizjng effect on price dynaniics. Figure (5) shows two sin~ulations; the 
upper one is from the reference model and i n  the lower one. k3 has been decreased from 
0.5 to 0.3. A lower reward to specificity seenis here to increase short-term volatility (the 
same result has been obtained by increasing p(g) relative to p(s) in the genetic algorithni). 
In other words, routines (in the narrow nizariing i t  is given here) would seen1 to be 
destabilizing. 
l ~ h e  mphasis on the automaticity of behaviour entailed by a routine has been made by e.g. Nelson & 
Winter (1982) and March & Simon (1993). 
0 1  : I I , , , ,  , I , , ,  I I I 1 I I  , , I , ,  I , ,  
Generality and specificity 
Figure (5) 
V Concl~rding remarks 
This exercise is intended to show that exchange rare dyna~nics close to the one observed 
could be generated by an alternative mechanisnl where the central role is given to the 
formation of expectations and, more generiilly, to learning processes of imperfectly 
rational agents. The results obtained seem quite promising, but some open qi~estions and 
unsolved issues remain, which should be pursued i n  future research. 
First, the model is very simple: agents have only one period-ahead expectations and very 
little information. In turn, one has to introduce a centralizing irlstitution to allow agents to 
transact. How much more 'intelligence' our agents should be endowed with to be able to 
coordinate i n  a decentralized market would be an interesting issue to explore. 
Second, classifier systems, if they allow us to model an evolutionary learning process, 
are essentially black boxes. Building indicators to track niore precisely what is going on 
inside these systenis (e.g. i n  terms of inertia and heterogeneity of the niodels of the 
world) should be on the agenda 
Finally, there is a whole array of methodological issues to be tackled concerning 
inference in  simulation models. For instance, as Lane (1992) puts it, "Can we argue that 
the real world aggregate regularity is indeed 'caused by' the entities and interactions we 
abstracted out of i t  and built into the artificial world, in  which the analog of that regularity 
was identified as an emergent property?" (p. 9). And how long should a specific feature 
persist to be considered as an emergent regularity? No rigourous arlswers are yet 
available on those topics but i t  does not seem too farfetched to assurne that an identity 
between observed and enlergellt propenies increases the plausibility that the phenomenon 
under scrutiny is 'caused' by the modelled mechanisms. Such an identity has not been 
shown here, and a thorough statistical treatnlent of the price series generated by this 
model is the next step of our research. 
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